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Part I : Trajectory based algorithms
Minghui Zhu, Michael Otte, Pratik Chaudhari, Emilio Frazzoli
Abstract— We consider a class of multi-robot motion plan-
ning problems where each robot is associated with multiple
objectives and decoupled task specifications. The problems are
formulated as an open-loop non-cooperative differential game.
A distributed anytime algorithm is proposed to compute a Nash
equilibrium of the game. The following properties are proven:
(i) the algorithm asymptotically converges to the set of Nash
equilibrium; (ii) for scalar cost functionals, the price of stability
equals one; (iii) for the worst case, the computational complexity
and communication cost are linear in the robot number.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robotic motion planning is a fundamental problem where
a control sequence is found to steer a robot from the initial
state to the goal set, while enforcing the environmental
rules. It is well-known that the problem is computationally
challenging [23]. The situation is even worse for multi-
robot motion planning since the computational complexity
exponentially grows as the robot number.
For multi-robot motion planning, non-cooperative game
theoretic controller synthesis is interesting in two aspects:
descriptive and perspective. From the descriptive point of
view, Nash equilibrium is desirable in inherently competitive
scenarios. More specifically, Nash equilibrium characterizes
the stable scenarios among inherently self-interested players
where none can benefit from unilateral deviations. From the
perspective point of view, non-cooperative game theoretic
learning holds the promise of providing computationally
efficient algorithms for multi-robot controllers where the
robots are assumed to be self-interested. Although Nash
equilibrium may not be socially optimal, game theoretic
approaches remain useful when the computational efficiency
dominates.
There have been limited results on rigorous analysis of
game theoretic controller synthesis for multi-robot motion
planning. The paper [19] tackles multi-robot motion planning
in the framework of feedback differential games. However, it
lacks of the rigorous analysis of the algorithm’s convergence
and computational complexity. In addition, static game the-
ory has been used to synthesize distributed control schemes
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to steer multiple vehicles to stationary and meaningful con-
figurations; e.g., in [29] for optimal sensor deployment, in [1]
for vehicle routing and in [2] for target assignment.
Contributions. This paper presents the first distributed,
anytime algorithm to compute open-loop Nash equilibrium
for non-cooperative robots. More specifically, we consider a
class of multi-robot motion planning problems where each
robot is associated with multiple objectives and decoupled
task specifications. The problems are formulated as an
open-loop non-cooperative differential game. By leveraging
the RRG algorithm in [16], iterative better response and
model checking, a distributed anytime computation algo-
rithm, namely the iNash-trajectory algorithm, is proposed to
find a Nash equilibrium of the game. We formally analyze
the algorithm convergence, the price of stability as well
as the computational complexity and communication cost.
The algorithm performance is demonstrated by a number of
numerical simulations.
Literature review. Sampling based algorithms have been
demonstrated to be efficient in addressing robotic motion
planning in high-dimension spaces. The Rapidly-exploring
Random Tree (RRT) algorithm and its variants; e.g., in [18],
[20], are able to find a feasible path quickly. Recently, two
novel algorithms, PRM∗ and RRT∗, have been developed
in [16], and shown to be computationally efficient and
asymptotically optimal. In [17], a class of sampling-based
algorithms is proposed to compute the optimal trajectory
satisfying the given task specifications in the form of de-
terministic µ-calculus.
Regarding the multi-robot open-loop motion planning,
the approaches mainly fall into three categories: centralized
planning in; e.g., [24], [28], decoupled planning in; e.g., [15],
[26] and priority planning in; e.g., [9], [12]. Centralized
planning is complete but computationally expensive. In con-
trast, decoupled and priority planning can generate solutions
quicker, but are incomplete. However, the existing algorithms
assume the robots are cooperative and are not directly
applicable to compute Nash equilibrium where none of self-
interested robots is willing to unilaterally deviate from.
Another set of relevant papers are concerned with nu-
merical methods for feedback differential games. There
have been a very limited number of feedback differential
games whose closed-form solutions are known, including
homicidal-chauffeur and the lady-in-the-lake games [8],
[13]. The methods based on partial differential equations;
e.g., in [6], [7], [27], viability theory; e.g., in [3], [4], [10]
and level-set methods, e.g., in [25] have been proposed to
determine numerical solutions to differential games. How-
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ever, the papers aforementioned only study one-player and
two-player differential games. Multi-player linear-quadratic
differential games have been studied in; e.g., [8].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a team of robots, labeled by VR , {1, · · · , N}.
Each robot is associated with a dynamic system governed by
the following differential equation:
x˙i(t) = fi(xi(t), ui(t)), (1)
where xi(t) ∈ Xi ⊆ Rni is the state of robot i, and
ui(t) ∈ Ui is the control of robot i. For system (1), the
set of admissible control strategies for robot i is given by:
Ui , {ui(·) : [0,+∞)→ Ui, measurable},
where Ui ⊆ Rmi . For each robot i, σ[i] : [0,+∞) → Xi
is a dynamically feasible trajectory if there are T ≥ 0 and
ui : [0, T ] → Ui such that: (i) σ˙[i](t) = fi(σ[i](t), ui(t));
(ii) σ[i](0) = x
[i]
init; (iii) σ
[i](t) ∈ XFi for t ∈ [0, T ]; (iv)
σ[i](T ) ∈ XGi . The set of dynamically feasible trajectories
for robot i is denoted by Σi. Note that the trajectories in Σi
do not account for the inter-robot collisions.
Let Πi be a finite set of atomic propositions and λi :
Xi → 2Πi associates each state in Xi with a set of atomic
propositions in Πi. Given a trajectory σ[i] of (1), define by
T (σ[i]) the set of time instances when λi(σ[i](t)) changes.
The word w(σ[i]) , {w0, w1, · · · } generated by the trajec-
tory σ[i] is such that wi = λi(σ[i](ti)) where t0 = 0 and
T (σ[i]) = {t1, t2, · · · }.
In this paper, we consider reachability tasks where each
robot has to reach an open goal set XGi ⊂ X and simultane-
ously maintain the state xi(t) inside a closed constraint set
XFi ⊆ X . As an example, let Πi = {pG, pF } be the set of
atomic propositions. The proposition pG is true if xi ∈ XGi
and similarly, pF is true if xi ∈ XFi . Consider an example
task specification Φi expressed using the finite fragment of
Linear Temporal Logic, (FLTL) [21] as Φi = F pG ∧G pF
where F is the eventually operator and G stands for the
always operator. If the word formed by a trajectory σ[i]
is such that for w(σ[i]) = w0, w1, . . . , there exists some
wk such that pG ∈ wk and pF ∈ wi for all i ≥ 0, we
say that the word w(σ[i]) satisfies the LTL formula Φi. Let
us note that FLTL formulae such as those considered here
can be automatically translated into automata. The word
w(σ[i]) satisfies the formula if it belongs to the language
of the corresponding automaton. Please refer [5] for a more
thorough exposition of these concepts. Denote by [Φi] ⊆
Σi the set of trajectories fulfilling Φi. Each robot then
determines a trajectory belonging to [Φi].
In addition to finding a trajectory that satisfies these
specifications, the robot may have several other objectives
such as reaching in the goal region in the shortest possible
time. To quantify these objectives, we define Cost : Σ →
R
p
≥0 as the cost functional which maps each trajectory in
Σ ,
⊗
i∈VR Σi
1 to a non-negative cost vector and each
component of Cost corresponds to an objective of the robots.
1⊗ represents the product.
In what follows, we assume that Cost is continuous. In
addition, the robots want to avoid the inter-robot collisions;
i.e., keeping the state x(t) outside the collision set Xcol.
The above multi-robot motion planning problem is for-
mulated as an open-loop non-cooperative game where each
robot seeks to find a trajectory which is collision-free,
fulfills its task specifications and minimizes the induced
cost given the trajectories of other robots. That is, given
σ[−i] ∈ Σ−i2, each robot i wants to find a best trajectory in
the feasible set Feasiblei(Σi, σ[−i]) , {σ[i] ∈ Σi | σ[i] ∈
[Φi], CollisionFreePath(σ
[i], σ[−i]) = 1} where the
procedure CollisionFreePath will be defined later. The
solution notion we will use is Nash equilibrium formally
stated as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Nash equilibrium): The collection of
trajectories (σ¯[i])i∈VR ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium if for any
i ∈ VR, it holds that σ¯[i] ∈ Feasiblei(Σi, σ¯[−i]) and there
is no σ[i] ∈ Feasiblei(Σi, σ¯[−i]) such that Cost(σ[i]) ≺
Cost(σ¯[i])3.
Intuitively, none of the robots can decrease its cost by
unilaterally deviating from a Nash equilibrium. Denote by
ΠNE ⊆ Σ the set of Nash equilibria. Note that Definition 2.1
is an extension of the standard one; e.g., in [8] where the cost
functional of each player is scalar. We will compare Nash
equilibrium with social (Pareto) optimum defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Social (Pareto) optimum): The collec-
tion of trajectories (σ¯[i])i∈VR ∈ Σ is socially (Pareto) optimal
if there is no (σ[i])i∈VR ∈ Σ such that
⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ
[i]) ≺⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ¯
[i]).4
Denote by ΠSO ⊆ Σ the set of social optimum. Through-
out this paper, we assume that ΠSO 6= ∅. In general, a
Nash equilibrium may not be socially optimal. When Cost
is scalar, the gap between the set of Nash equilibrium and
the set of social optimum is usually characterized by price
of anarchy and price of stability in; e.g., [22].
A. Primitives
Here we define a set of primitives which will be used in
the subsequent sections.
a) Sampling: The Sample(A) procedure returns uni-
formly random samples from set A.
b) Local steering: Given two states x, y, the Steer
procedure returns a state z by steering x towards y for at most
η > 0 distance; i.e., Stear(x, y) , argminz∈B(x,η)‖z − y‖.
In addition to this, we require that σ(x, y), the trajectory
connecting states x and y, is such that |T (σ(x, y))| ≤ 1, i.e.,
the label λ(σ(x, y)) changes at most once. This property of
the local steering function is called trace inclusivity [11].
c) Nearest neighbor: Given a state x and a finite set S
of states, the Nearest procedure returns the state in S that
is closest to x; i.e., Nearest(S, x) , argminy∈S‖y − x‖.
2We use −i to denote all the robots other than i.
3The relation  is defined on Rp and given by: for a, b ∈ Rp, a  b if
and only if a` ≤ b` for all ` ∈ {1, · · · , p}. Note that  is a partial order
on Rp.
4⊕ represents the summation.
d) Near vertices: Given a state x, a finite set S and
a positive real number r, the NearVertices procedure
returns the states in S where each of them is r-close to x;
NearVertices(S, x, r) , {y ∈ S | ‖x− y‖ ≤ r}.
e) Path generation: Given a directed graph G with a
single root and no directed cycles, the PathGeneration(G)
procedure returns the set of paths from the root to the leaf
vertices.
f) Collision check of paths: Given a path σ and a set of
paths Π, the CollisionFreePath(σ,Π) procedure returns 1
if σ collides any path in Π; i.e., σ(t) ∈ Xfree ,
⊗
i∈VR XFi ∩
X col; otherwise returns 0.
g) Feasible paths: Given the path sets of Σi and
σ[−i], Feasiblei(Σi, σ[−i]) is the set of paths σ[i] ∈
Σi such that for any σ[i] ∈ Σi, it holds that
CollisionFreePath(σ[i], σ[−i]) = 1.
h) Weakly feasible paths: Given the path sets of
Σi and σ[−i], WeakFeasiblei(Σi, σ[−i]) is a subset of
Feasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]) and consists of the paths σ[i] where
for each path σ[i], there are a sequence of paths {σ[i]` } with
σ
[i]
` ∈ Σi and a diminishing and non-negative sequence {δ`}
such that (i) σ[i]` converges to σ
[i]; (ii) B(σ[i]` (t), δ`) ∈ XFi ;
(ii) ‖σ[i]` (t)− σ[j](t)‖ ≥ + δ` for all j 6= i for all t.
i) Strongly feasible paths: Given the path sets of
Σi and σ[−i]), StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]) is a subset of
Feasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]) and consists of the paths where for
each path σ[i], there are a sequence of paths {σ[i]` } with σ[i]` ∈
Σi, a diminishing and non-negative sequence {δ`} and δ > 0
such that (i) σ[i]` converges to σ
[i]; (ii) B(σ[i]` (t), δ`) ∈ XFi ;
(ii) ‖σ[i](t)− σ[j](t)‖ ≥ + δ for all j 6= i.
III. INASH-TRAJECTORY ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose the iNash-trajectory Algorithm
to solve the open-loop game defined above. It is followed by
the algorithm analysis and discussion.
A. Algorithm statement
The iNash-trajectory Algorithm leverages the RRG algo-
rithm in [16], iterative better response and model checking,
and informally stated as follows. At each iteration k, each
robot i samples Xi once, and adds the new sample x[i]rand
to its vertex set V [i]k . Robot i extends its previously gener-
ated graph G[i]k−1 towards the new sample x
[i]
rand via local
steering, and obtains the new graph G[i]k . After they finish
the construction of the new graphs, the active robots play a
game on their product graph for one round in a sequential
way. Robot i is active at time k if its goal set is reachable
through some path of G[i]k . The active robot with the least
index, say i, first chooses a smaller-cost and feasible path
on G[i]k by performing the BetterResponse procedure in
Algorithm 3. Then robot i informs all other robots the new
path. After that, the active robot with the second least index,
say j, performs the better response to update its path on
G
[j]
k and the new path is sent to other robots. The remaining
active robots sequentially update the planned paths on their
own graphs and announce the new paths to others. Once all
Algorithm 1: The iNash-trajectory Algorithm
1 for i = 1 : N do
2 V [i](0)← x[i]init;
3 E[i](0)← ∅;
4 Ak ← ∅;
5 k ← 1;
6 while k < K do
7 for i = 1 : N do
8 x
[i]
rand ← Sample(Xi);
9 G
[i]
k ← Extend(G[i]k−1, x[i]rand);
10 for i ∈ VR \Ak−1 do
11 if V [i]k ∩ XGi 6= ∅ then
12 Ak ← Ak−1 ∪ {i};
13 for i ∈ Ak do
14 σ˜
[i]
k = σ
[i]
k−1;
15 for i = 1 : N do
16 if i ∈ Ak then
17 Π
[i]
k ← {{σ[j]k }j∈Ak,j<i, {σ˜[j]k }j∈Ak,j>i};
18 σ
[i]
k ← BetterResponse(G[i]k ,Π[i]k );
19 k ← k + 1;
the active robots finish the path updates, the game terminates
for the current iteration k. At the next iteration k + 1, the
same steps are repeated. The iNash-trajectory Algorithm is
formally stated in Algorithm 1.
The iNash-trajectory algorithm is an anytime algorithm;
i.e., assuming a solution can be found within the allotted
planning time, then it is continually improved while planning
time remains
B. Discussion
The Extend procedure is similar to that in the RRG
algorithm [16] with the difference that the edges leaving from
the new sample are not added. Instead, G[i]k is identical to
the auxiliary graph Gn used in the proof of Theorem 38
in [16] for RRT∗. Notice that G[i]k is a directed graph and
does not include any directed circle. So there are a finite
number of paths for the root to reach any leaf vertex and the
PathGeneration procedure in Algorithm 3 is well-defined.
The tree structure returned by RRT∗ in [16] is more com-
putationally efficient than the graph G[i]k in our algorithm.
However, the rewiring step in RRT∗ induces that G[i]k−1
may not be a subgraph of G[i]k . This property is crucial for
the algorithm convergence to Nash equilibria in the next
section. To verify if (σ[i] ∩ G[i]k ) ∈ [Φi] on Line 4 of
the BetterResponse procedure, we check if the sequence
ξi = (σ
[i] ∩ G[i]k ) satisfies Φi by translating Φi into the
corresponding Buchi automaton.
C. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic optimality,
computational complexity, and communication cost of the
iNash-trajectory Algorithm. Before doing that, we first prove
the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 (Existence of Nash equilibrium): It holds
that ΠSO ⊆ ΠNE and ΠNE is non-empty.
Algorithm 2: The Extend Procedure
1 V ← V [i]k−1;
2 E ← E[i]k−1;
3 xnearest ← Nearest(E, x[i]rand);
4 xnew ← Steer(xnearest, x[i]rand);
5 if ObstacleFree(xnearest, xnew) then
6 Xnear ← NearVertices(E, xnew,min{γ( log kk )
1
n , η});
7 V ← V ∪ {xnew};
8 for xnear ∈ Xnear do
9 if ObstacleFree(xnearest, xnew) then
10 E ← E ∪ {(xnearest, xnew)};
11 return G = (V,E)
Algorithm 3: The BetterResponse Procedure
1 P[i]k ← PathGeneration(G[i]k );
2 P[i]f ← ∅;
3 for σ[i] ∈ P[i]k do
4 if CollisionFreePath(σ[i],Π[i]k ) ==
1 && (σ[i] ∩G[i]k ) ∈ [Φi] then
5 P[i]f ← P[i]f ∪ {σ[i]};
6 σ
[i]
min ← σ[i]k−1;
7 for σ[i] ∈ P[i]f do
8 if Cost(σ[i]) ≺ Cost(σ[i]min) then
9 σ
[i]
min ← σ[i];
10 Break;
11 return σ[i]min
Proof: We will show ΠSO ⊆ ΠNE by contradiction.
Assume ΠSO ∩ ΠNE 6= ∅ with ΠNE being the complement
of ΠNE, and pick any (σ[i])i∈VR ∈ ΠSO ∩ ΠNE. Since
(σ[i])i∈VR /∈ ΠNE, there is some i ∈ VR and σ¯[i] ∈
Feasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]) such that Cost(σ¯[i]) ≺ Cost(σ[i]).
Let (σ¯[i])i∈VR with σ¯
[j] = σ[j] for j 6= i.
Note that σ¯[j] ∈ Feasiblej(Σj , σ¯[−j]) for all j 6=
i, and Cost(σ¯[i]) = Cost(σ[i]). It implies that⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ¯
[i]) ≺ ⊕i∈VR Cost(σ[i]) contradicting that
(σ[i])i∈VR is socially optimal. Therefore, ΠSO ⊆ ΠNE. Since
ΠSO is non-empty, so is ΠNE.
In what follows, we establishes the following two in-
strumental results for asymptotic optimality. In particu-
lar, Lemma 3.2 shows that given σ[−i], any path in
WeakFeasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]) can be approximated by a se-
quence of paths in {Feasiblei(G[i]k , σ[−i])}k≥0. Lemma 3.3
shows that StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ¯
[−i]) is a subset of σ[i] ∈
StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]
k ) for all but a finite k where
{σ[−i]k }k≥0 converges to σ¯[−i].
Lemma 3.2: Consider any i ∈ VR and σ[−i] ∈
⊗
j 6=i Σj .
For any ε > 0, there is T ≥ 0 such that for any
k ≥ T and σ[i] ∈ WeakFeasiblei(Σi, σ[−i]), there is a
path σˆ[i]k ∈ Feasiblei(G[i]k , σ[−i]) such that ‖Cost(σˆ[i]k ) −
Cost(σ[i])‖ ≤ ε.
Proof: Recall that G[i]k is identical to the auxiliary graph
Gn used in the proof of Theorem 38 for RRT∗. One can finish
the proof by following the lines for Theorem 38 in [16] and
using the fact of Cost being continuous.
Lemma 3.3: Assume that {σ[j]k }k≥0 converges to σ¯[j]
for each j ∈ VR. There is T ′ ≥ 0 such that for each
σ[i] ∈ StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ¯[−i]), it holds that σ[i] ∈
StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ
[−i]
k ) for all k ≥ T ′.
Proof: Since {σ[j]k }k≥0 converges to σ¯[j], there is T ′ ≥
0 such that ‖σ¯[j](t)−σ[j]k (t)‖ ≤ δ2 for all k ≥ T ′ and j ∈ VR.
Recall that σ[i] ∈ StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ¯[−i]). Then
there are {σ[i]` } converging to σ[i], {δ`} and δ > 0 such
that B(σ[i]` (t), δ`) ∈ XFi and ‖σ[i](t)− σ¯[j](t)‖ ≥ +δ. This
further implies that ‖σ[i](t)−σ[j]k (t)‖ ≥ + δ2 for all k ≥ T ′.
We then conclude that σ[i] ∈ StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ[−i]k )
for all k ≥ T ′.
Let Σˆ be the set of limit points of {σ[i]k }i∈VR . We are ready
to show the convergence of the iNash-trajectory Algorithm.
Theorem 3.1 (Asymptotic optimality): There is c¯[i]` ≥ 0
such that Cost`(σ¯[i]) = c¯
[i]
` for any {σ¯[i]}i∈VR ∈ Σˆ. In
addition, any limit point {σ¯[i]}i∈VR is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: First of all, notice that Ak ⊆ Ak+1. It renders
that the probability of Ak 6= VR exponentially decays to
zero. Without loss of any generality, we consider Ak = VR
for k ≥ 0 in the remainder of the proof.
Consider iteration k and assume that robots 1, · · · , i − 1
have updated their paths via Step 16 in the iNash-trajectory
Algorithm. It is the turn of robot i to update the path
via Step 16. Since G[i]k ⊇ G[i]k−1, so σ˜[i]k = σ[i]k−1 ∈
Feasiblei(G
[i]
k ,Π
[i]
k ). This implies
Cost(σ
[i]
k )  Cost(σ˜[i]k ) = Cost(σ[i]k−1).
Hence, for each ` ∈ {1, · · · , p}, the sequence
{Cost`(σ[i]k )}k≥0 is non-increasing. Since Cost`(σ[i]k )
is lower bounded by zero, so the sequence {Cost`(σ[i]k )}
converges to some constant c¯[i]` ≥ 0. Hence, we have
Cost`(σ¯
[i]) = c¯
[i]
` for any limit point {σ¯[i]}i∈VR ∈ Σˆ.
We proceed to show that any limit point {σ¯[i]}i∈VR ∈ Σˆ
is a Nash equilibrium. There is a subsequence pii , {ki}
such that {σ[i]k }k∈pii converge to σ¯[i]. Let pi , ∩i∈VRpii.
Without loss of any generality, we assume that pi = Z≥0 in
the remainder of the proof.
For each i ∈ VR, there is no σ˜[i]k ∈ Feasiblei(G[i]k ,Π[i]k )
such that
Cost(σ
[i]
k )  Cost(σ˜[i]k ). (2)
Pick any ε > 0. By Lemma 3.2 with σ[−i] = Π[i]k , there is
T such that for any σˆ[i]k ∈ WeakFeasiblei(Σi,Π[i]k ), there
is σ˜[i]k ∈ Feasiblei(G[i]k ,Π[i]k ) such that
Cost(σ˜
[i]
k )  Cost(σˆ[i]k ) + ε1p, (3)
where 1p is the column vector with p ones.
The combination of (2) and (3) renders that there is no
σˆ
[i]
k ∈ WeakFeasiblei(Σi,Π[i]k ) and k ≥ T such that:
Cost(σ
[i]
k )  Cost(σˆ[i]k ) + ε1p. (4)
Notice that StrongFeasiblei(Σi,Π
[i]
k ) ⊆
WeakFeasiblei(Σi,Π
[i]
k ) ⊆ Feasiblei(Σi,Π[i]k ). Combine
this property, (3) and Lemma 3.3 with σ[i]k = Π
[i]
k , and
we reach that there is T ′ ≥ T such that there is no
σ[i] ∈ StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ¯[−i]) and k ≥ T ′ such that:
Cost(σ
[i]
k )  Cost(σ[i]) + ε1p. (5)
Take the limit on k in (5). Then there is no σ[i] ∈
StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ¯
[−i]) such that
Cost(σ¯[i])  Cost(σ[i]) + ε1p. (6)
Since (6) holds for ε > 0, no σ[i] ∈
StrongFeasiblei(Σi, σ¯
[−i]) exists such that
Cost(σ¯[i])  Cost(σ[i]). (7)
Since (7) holds for any i ∈ VR, it establishes that the limit
point {σ¯[i]}i∈VR is a Nash equilibrium.
The completeness of the algorithm is a direct result of
Lemma 3.1 and the asymptotic convergence to ΠNE. It
completes the proof.
Next, we will analyze the computational complexity of
the algorithm in terms of the CollisionFreePath pro-
cedure. Let θn to be the total number of calls to the
CollisionFreePath procedure at iteration n.
Lemma 3.4 (Computational complexity): It holds that
θn ≤
⊕
i∈VR |P
[i]
k |, where P[i]k is defined in Algorithm 3.
In Lemma 3.4, the quantity |P[i]k | is independent of the
robot number. So the worst computational complexity of the
iNash-trajectory grows linearly in the robot number. It is in
contrast to the exponential dependency in centralized path
planning. The computational efficiency comes with the non-
cooperative game theoretic formulation where each robot
myopically responds to others. Note that a Nash equilibrium
may not be socially optimal for the robot team.
Let ϑn to be the number of exchanged paths in iteration n.
The following lemma shows the worst communication cost
is linear in the robot number.
Lemma 3.5 (Communication cost): ϑn ≤ 2N .
Proof: At iteration n, all the active robots broadcast
their planned trajectories before the path updates. Then the
active robots sequentially update and broadcast the new
paths. So ϑn = 2|Ak| ≤ 2N .
D. Comparison
In order to demonstrate the scalability of iNash-trajectory
Algorithm, we consider the benchmark algorithm, the iOp-
timalControl Algorithm. The key difference between the
iOptimalControl and iNash-trajectory Algorithms is that a
centralized authority in the iOptimalControl Algorithm de-
termines a social optimum on the product graph at each
iteration. In the iOptimalControl Algorithm, we use the
notation (σ ∩⊗i∈Ak G[i]k ) ∈ [Φ] for (σ[i] ∩ G[i]k ) ∈ [Φi]
for all i ∈ Ak.
The following theorem guarantees the asymptotic optimal-
ity of the iOptimalControl Algorithm.
Theorem 3.2 (Asymptotic optimality): Any limit point
{σ¯[i]}i∈VR is a social optimum.
Proof: It is a direct result of Theorem 38 in [16].
Next, we will analyze the computational complexity of
the algorithm in terms of the CollisionFreePath pro-
Algorithm 4: The iOptimalControl Algorithm
1 for i = 1 : N do
2 V [i](0)← x[i]init;
3 E[i](0)← ∅;
4 Ak ← ∅;
5 k ← 1;
6 while k < K do
7 for i = 1 : N do
8 x
[i]
rand ← Sample(Xi);
9 G
[i]
k ← Extend(G[i]k−1, x[i]rand);
10 for i ∈ VR \Ak−1 do
11 if V [i]k ∩ XGi 6= ∅ then
12 Ak ← Ak−1 ∪ {i};
13 (σ
[i]
k )i∈Ak ← OptimalTrajectory(
⊗
i∈Ak G
[i]
k );
14 k ← k + 1;
Algorithm 5: The OptimalTrajectory Procedure
1 for i ∈ Ak do
2 Q[i]k ← PathGeneration(G[i]k );
3 for i ∈ Ak do
4 P[i]f ← ∅;
5 for σ[i] ∈ Q[i]k do
6 if CollisionFreePath(σ[i],Q[−i]k ) ==
1 && (σ ∩⊗i∈Ak G[i]k ) ∈ [Φ] then
7 P[i]f ← P[i]f ∪ {σ[i]};
8 σmin ← Sample(⊗i∈Ak P[i]f );
9 for σ ∈⊗i∈Ak P[i]f do
10 if
⊕
i∈Ak Cost(σ
[i]) ≺⊕i∈Ak Cost(σ[i]min) then
11 σmin ← σ;
12 return σmin
cedure. Let θ′n to be the total number of calls to the
CollisionFreePath procedure at iteration n.
Lemma 3.6 (Computational complexity): It holds that
θ′n =
⊗
i∈VR |Q
[i]
k |, where Q[i]k is defined in Algorithm 5.
The above lemma shows that the computational complex-
ity exponentially grows vs. robot number. Table I summarizes
the comparison of the iOptimalControl and iNash-trajectory
Algorithms where the prices of anarchy and stability are
compared for the case p = 1. In particular, the price
of stability (POS) [22] is the ratio between the minimum
additive cost function value in ΠNE and that of one in ΠSO,
and defined as follows:
POS =
infσ∈ΠNE
⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ
[i])⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ¯
[i])
,
for any σ¯ ∈ ΠSO. By Lemma 3.1, we know ΠSO ⊆ ΠNE
and thus POS is equal to 1. On the other hand, the price
of anarchy (POA) [22] is the ratio between the maximum
additive cost function value in ΠNE and that of one in ΠSO,
and given by:
POA =
supσ∈ΠNE
⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ
[i])⊕
i∈VR Cost(σ¯
[i])
,
for any σ¯ ∈ ΠSO. The value of POA depends on a number of
q0 q1
pF ∧ ¬pGi
pF ∧ pGi
pF
Fig. 1: Automaton for Φi = F pGi ∧G pF .
factors; e.g., the obstacle locations, the dynamic systems and
so on. It is interesting to find a lower bound on ΠSO given
more information as in; e.g., [14], and utilize mechanism
design to eliminate the price of anarchy.
TABLE I: The comparison of the iOptimalControl and
iNash-trajectory Algorithms
iOptimalControl iNash-trajectory
Solution Notion Social optimum Nash equilibrium
Solution Feasibility Yes Yes
Price of stability N/A One
Price of anarchy N/A Unknown
Coordination High Low
Asymptotic optimality Yes Yes
Computational complexity Exponential Linear
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We perform two experiments in simulation to evaluate the
performance of iNash. The first involves 8 circular robots
moving in an environment with randomly generated obstacles
(Figure 2-left), while the second involves 6 robots in a
traffic intersection scenario (Figure 2-right); both involve
state spaces consisting of first order dynamics and time.
Robots are holonomic discs with radii of 0.5 meters.
We compare iNash to two prioritized methods that are
not guaranteed to return a Nash-Equilibrium, but are ar-
guably similar to our proposed algorithm. The first is the
standard prioritized approach from [12]. Each robot builds
its own random graph; then robots select their paths in
order such that the path of robot i does not conflict with
robots 1, . . . , i− 1. The second is an any-time version of
the prioritized method. Each time robot i finds a better path
that does not conflict with the paths of robots 1, . . . , i − 1,
then for j = i+1, i+2, . . . (in order) robot j must choose a
new path that does not conflict with robots 1, . . . , j−1. This
differs from our algorithm (where new paths must respect the
paths of all other robots), and the solution is not guaranteed
to converge to a Nash Equilibrium.
For experiments we consider the task specifications for
each robot to be of the form Φi = F pGi ∧G pF , i.e., each
robot tries to reach a different goal region in the shortest
possible distance while respecting the same constraint set
XF . The automaton consists of two states (see Fig. 1).
Discussion of Experimental Results: Experimental results
are summarized in tables II-III. In iNash all robots tend to
bear the burden of conflict resolution similarly, on average.
This contrasts with the prioritized methods, in which robot’s
with lower IDs have shorter paths and reach the goal more
frequently than robots with higher IDs. The result that some
iNash paths are longer than the prioritized paths is expected,
given that in iNash robots act in their own self interest.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discusses a class of multi-robot motion plan-
ning problems where each robot is associated with multiple-
objectives and independent class specifications. We formu-
lated the problem as an open-loop, non-cooperative differ-
ential game and proposed a distributed, anytime algorithm
to compute the Nash equilibrium. Techniques from Rapidly-
exploring Random Graphs and iterative better response were
used to provide convergence guarantees and analyse the
price of stability as well as the communication cost of the
algorithm. We also presented results of simulation exper-
iments that demonstrate the efficiency and anytime nature
of the algorithm. Future directions include coupled task
specifications of robots and algorithms which can eliminate
the price of anarchy.
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